Zanu Pf’s Three (3) Leadership Succession Plans.

The last time succession was broached in Zanu Pf was prior to national independence. It was not placed on the table because of the incumbent leader’s advancement by way of age, but more because of differences in strategic considerations as to the direction the liberation struggle should take. Agreed there were personality differences, but these came to be expressed largely through the lenses of ideological and strategic values and principles.

At the moment however, the succession debate in Zanu Pf appears to be motivated by the fact that its leader is now advanced in years and therefore will inevitably have to pass on the leadership baton stick of both party as well as executive government.

And, given the slight hint by President Mugabe at the 34th independence commemorations, Zanu Pf has three succession plans. One that resides in the constitution and another two to be found in a direct political reconfiguration of itself.

The first and most evident plan is initially premised on Section 101 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. This section states, among other things, in the event of the President’s death or resignation, the First Vice President assumes office for the remainder of the term of office of the previous incumbent.  It is however circumvented by the Sixth Schedule, Part 4 (14), which gives transitional provisions for the first  ten years after the July 2013 election. Especially as regards, the succession of the President.  In this Sixth Schedule , the successor to the President must be elected by the party  from which the previous president emanated from. In the current case, this party is Zanu Pf.

So as it is constitutionally given, unless she fails to get the ruling party to send her name as presidential nominee to the Speaker of the House of Assembly within ninety days, First Vice President Mujuru between now and the next general election in 2018, is the apparent successor to President Mugabe. Even more-so given the fact that there is currently one Vice President in office.

The second succession plan is perhaps the one that is causing the factionalism in Zanu Pf.  Its key factor and trump card would be a change of the personality that currently holds the First Vice Presidency of the party.  This, before the current incumbent departs from political office for whatever reason.

In this regard, the faction that is resisting First Vice President Mujuru’s potential presidency has its sights set on the next Zanu Pf elective Congress which is due later on this year.  In this, they intend as far as is permitted by President Mugabe to campaign for a new First Vice President of their party. Should they succeed, their candidate would then be in a stronger position line to ascend to the post of president of Zimbabwe between now and 2018.  Especially after receiving party endorsement, a matter that has great value in Zanu Pf.

In this same said second option, there would be the possibility of getting a second Vice President (a vacant office both at national and party level)  elected at their congress.  This candidate would then be able to be appointed Acting President prior to the departure from office of the incumbent and therefore serve for at least 90 days before having to face approval by the ruling party and the House of Assembly.

It is an option that however has high political risks, which include exacerbating already existent divisions but also not having the blessing of the incumbent.  It is one that they are least likely to explore to the full. Instead, they will use it as a negotiating platform for the third succession plan.

This third succession plan is dependent on the ability of the two major factions within Zanu Pf to agree to share power after the departure of President Mugabe.  It also entails the ruling party’s willingness to amend the Chapter Five of the constitution in two respects.

Firstly, they could take the model of their erstwhile allies, the Russians, and introduce the office of a Prime Minister that works concurrently with that of the President.  This would mean the contesting faction would need to accept an initial Mujuru presidency in exchange for a potential reversal of roles as has been the case with Russian President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev.

Secondly they could amend the constitution to share powers between the offices of the President and the two deputies.  This latter amendment is less likely due to the evident inability of the Zanu Pf leadership to want to share the spoils and its longstanding tradition of having a singular executive authority.

In the final analysis however the incumbent leader of Zanu Pf has made it apparent that succession is inevitable. Both by way of his public statements as well as in his signing of Constitutional Amendment Number 20 into law.  The three succession plans I have outlined here are mere analysis based on the structural tenets of the constitution as well as an analysis of the existent factional politics in the ruling party.

The last time succession was broached in Zanu Pf was prior to national independence. It was not placed on the table because of the incumbent leader’s advancement by way of age, but more because of differences in strategic considerations as to the direction the liberation struggle should take. Agreed there were personality differences, but these came to be expressed largely through the lenses of ideological and strategic values and principles.

At the moment however, the succession debate in Zanu Pf appears to be motivated by the fact that its leader is now advanced in years and therefore will inevitably have to pass on the leadership baton stick of both party as well as executive government.

And, given the slight hint by President Mugabe at the 34th independence commemorations, Zanu Pf has three succession plans. One that resides in the constitution and another two to be found in a direct political reconfiguration of itself.

The first and most evident plan is initially premised on Section 101 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. This section states, among other things, in the event of the President’s death or resignation, the First Vice President assumes office for the remainder of the term of office of the previous incumbent.  It is however circumvented by the Sixth Schedule, Part 4 (14), which gives transitional provisions for the first  ten years after the July 2013 election. Especially as regards, the succession of the President.  In this Sixth Schedule , the successor to the President must be elected by the party  from which the previous president emanated from. In the current case, this party is Zanu Pf.

So as it is constitutionally given, unless she fails to get the ruling party to send her name as presidential nominee to the Speaker of the House of Assembly within ninety days, First Vice President Mujuru between now and the next general election in 2018, is the apparent successor to President Mugabe. Even more-so given the fact that there is currently one Vice President in office.

The second succession plan is perhaps the one that is causing the factionalism in Zanu Pf.  Its key factor and trump card would be a change of the personality that currently holds the First Vice Presidency of the party.  This, before the current incumbent departs from political office for whatever reason.

In this regard, the faction that is resisting First Vice President Mujuru’s potential presidency has its sights set on the next Zanu Pf elective Congress which is due later on this year.  In this, they intend as far as is permitted by President Mugabe to campaign for a new First Vice President of their party. Should they succeed, their candidate would then be in a stronger position line to ascend to the post of president of Zimbabwe between now and 2018.  Especially after receiving party endorsement, a matter that has great value in Zanu Pf.

In this same said second option, there would be the possibility of getting a second Vice President (a vacant office both at national and party level)  elected at their congress.  This candidate would then be able to be appointed Acting President prior to the departure from office of the incumbent and therefore serve for at least 90 days before having to face approval by the ruling party and the House of Assembly.

It is an option that however has high political risks, which include exacerbating already existent divisions but also not having the blessing of the incumbent.  It is one that they are least likely to explore to the full. Instead, they will use it as a negotiating platform for the third succession plan.

This third succession plan is dependent on the ability of the two major factions within Zanu Pf to agree to share power after the departure of President Mugabe.  It also entails the ruling party’s willingness to amend the Chapter Five of the constitution in two respects.

Firstly, they could take the model of their erstwhile allies, the Russians, and introduce the office of a Prime Minister that works concurrently with that of the President.  This would mean the contesting faction would need to accept an initial Mujuru presidency in exchange for a potential reversal of roles as has been the case with Russian President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev.

Secondly they could amend the constitution to share powers between the offices of the President and the two deputies.  This latter amendment is less likely due to the evident inability of the Zanu Pf leadership to want to share the spoils and its longstanding tradition of having a singular executive authority.

In the final analysis however the incumbent leader of Zanu Pf has made it apparent that succession is inevitable. Both by way of his public statements as well as in his signing of Constitutional Amendment Number 20 into law.  The three succession plans I have outlined here are mere analysis based on the structural tenets of the constitution as well as an analysis of the existent factional politics in the ruling party.

MDCs’ Fights over Victims of Political Violence Tragic, Symptomatic of Insensitive Leadership.

I read with great sadness, a story that appeared in a local daily, The Newsday, about the two MDC factions having a public spat about victims of political violence.  The Biti faction, through its spokesperson callously accused the Tsvangirai faction of having abandoned victims of political violence for ‘wives and houses’.  In turn, the Tsvangirai faction also through its spokesperson,  accused their newfound rivals of not only being elitist but also having abandoned victims of political violence.

While one understands that rivalry in opposition politics has been generally about petty grandstanding and name calling, this particular spat is not only tragic but callous.  It points to a political leadership that appears to have no sensitivity to actual victims of political violence.  Nor any sense of contrition for their shared failure to assist/rehabilitate the same.

In the process there is a sense of desperation on the part of the factions to want to claim those sizable number of supporters who have long been feeling  abandoned after losing relatives, limbs or property through political violence.    These supporters are however not naive or simply victims.  Given the fact that a number of them are in positions of leadership in either factions, they do not have any intention of leaving their respective placements if their issues are not addressed. Instead, they intend to negotiate for a greater stake in the political processes of their camps. Especially by way of leadership positions based on the recognition of not only their suffering political violence but also their ‘staying the course’  with one faction or the other.

This is all understandable particularly for those members who are finding themselves in a position in which they are now important to their respective national leadership. They have probably found new leases of political relevance due to the infighting, but at least its a recognition that had been missing for some time in the then united MDC T.
The more serious reflections are however the evident intentions of the factional leaders to scramble for this one-time abandoned party constituency.  The fact that they have now decided to publicly accuse each other of allegedly abandoning party victims of political violence in favour of opulent lifestyles is not only political opportunism of a dishonest nature. It is also a politics that sacrifices the seriousness of the issue of political violence and its victims at the altar of short term political expediency.
It is most unfortunate that both factions of the MDC-T have embarked on a public blame game on this issue.  Thee end effect of such will be in two particular respects. Firstly that the entirety of the issue of victims of political violence will be weakened in national discourse due to its continued politicisation or its being viewed from the accusatory angel of one faction over another.  This will undermine its being viewed as a holistic national issue that must transcend factional party politics in order for it to be legally and culturally impermissible in our body politic.

Secondly, the very fact that being close to or being a victim of political violence is now possibly being  presented as a legitimating act in the pursuit of leadership, or at least viewed as a demonstration of authenticity, does not bode well for opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It is bad enough to be a victim of political violence, an occurrence that must be taken most seriously particularly in terms of the rule of law than expedient political grandstanding only for the purposes of garnering factional support.

Instead of name calling, it would be democratically preferable if either of the two factions placed generic proposals on transitional justice on the policy table for consideration by the Human Rights or the  National Peace and Reconciliation Constitutional Commissions.  Or any other legal body they find constitutionally fit to deal much more holistically with the challenge of seeking justice and compensation for victims of political violence.

Finally, one of the key debating points around issues of political violence has been its one-sided nature, particularly where it concerns the ruling party supporters and state structure victimisation of opposition party members.  In this debate, it is emerging that a new trend of a shared  political traits and characteristic of a culture of violence might be affecting all major political parties. Both internally and in part externally.  Especially in cases where there are congresses or general elections to be held.  The issue therefore becomes a problem that cuts across the political divide, though at varying scales.

It is therefore a problem that is no longer in need of opportunistic partisanship but a much more concerted and holistic approach. While its effects and structural occurrence will not be solved overnight, it would be a good start if the MDC factions demonstrated good and organised leadership in seeking to address it.*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)I read with great sadness, a story that appeared in a local daily, The Newsday, about the two MDC factions having a public spat about victims of political violence.  The Biti faction, through its spokesperson callously accused the Tsvangirai faction of having abandoned victims of political violence for ‘wives and houses’.  In turn, the Tsvangirai faction also through its spokesperson,  accused their newfound rivals of not only being elitist but also having abandoned victims of political violence.
While one understands that rivalry in opposition politics has been generally about petty grandstanding and name calling, this particular spat is not only tragic but callous.  It points to a political leadership that appears to have no sensitivity to actual victims of political violence.  Nor any sense of contrition for their shared failure to assist/rehabilitate the same.
In the process there is a sense of desperation on the part of the factions to want to claim those sizable number of supporters who have long been feeling  abandoned after losing relatives, limbs or property through political violence.    These supporters are however not naive or simply victims.  Given the fact that a number of them are in positions of leadership in either factions, they do not have any intention of leaving their respective placements if their issues are not addressed. Instead, they intend to negotiate for a greater stake in the political processes of their camps.
Especially by way of leadership positions based on the recognition of not only their suffering political violence but also their ‘staying the course’  with one faction or the other.
This is all understandable particularly for those members who are finding themselves in a position in which they are now important to their respective national leadership. They have probably found new leases of political relevance due to the infighting, but at least its a recognition that had been missing for some time in the then united MDC T.
The more serious reflections are however the evident intentions of the factional leaders to scramble for this one-time abandoned party constituency.  The fact that they have now decided to publicly accuse each other of allegedly abandoning party victims of political violence in favour of opulent lifestyles is not only political opportunism of a dishonest nature. It is also a politics that sacrifices the seriousness of the issue of political violence and its victims at the altar of short term political expediency.
It is most unfortunate that both factions of the MDC-T have embarked on a public blame game on this issue.  Thee end effect of such will be in two particular respects. Firstly that the entirety of the issue of victims of political violence will be weakened in national discourse due to its continued politicisation or its being viewed from the accusatory angel of one faction over another.  This will undermine its being viewed as a holistic national issue that must transcend factional party politics in order for it to be legally and culturally impermissible in our body politic.
Secondly, the very fact that being close to or being a victim of political violence is now possibly being  presented as a legitimating act in the pursuit of leadership, or at least viewed as a demonstration of authenticity, does not bode well for opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It is bad enough to be a victim of political violence, an occurrence that must be taken most seriously particularly in terms of the rule of law than expedient political grandstanding only for the purposes of garnering factional support.
Instead of name calling, it would be democratically preferable if either of the two factions placed generic proposals on transitional justice on the policy table for consideration by the Human Rights or the  National Peace and Reconciliation Constitutional Commissions.  Or any other legal body they find constitutionally fit to deal much more holistically with the challenge of seeking justice and compensation for victims of political violence.
Finally, one of the key debating points around issues of political violence has been its one-sided nature, particularly where it concerns the ruling party supporters and state structure victimisation of opposition party members.  In this debate, it is emerging that a new trend of a shared  political traits and characteristic of a culture of violence might be affecting all major political parties. Both internally and in part externally.  Especially in cases where there are congresses or general elections to be held.  The issue therefore becomes a problem that cuts across the political divide, though at varying scales.
It is therefore a problem that is no longer in need of opportunistic partisanship but a much more concerted and holistic approach. While its effects and structural occurrence will not be solved overnight, it would be a good start if the MDC factions demonstrated good and organised leadership in seeking to address it.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)I read with great sadness, a story that appeared in a local daily, The Newsday, about the two MDC factions having a public spat about victims of political violence.  The Biti faction, through its spokesperson callously accused the Tsvangirai faction of having abandoned victims of political violence for ‘wives and houses’.  In turn, the Tsvangirai faction also through its spokesperson,  accused their newfound rivals of not only being elitist but also having abandoned victims of political violence.
While one understands that rivalry in opposition politics has been generally about petty grandstanding and name calling, this particular spat is not only tragic but callous.  It points to a political leadership that appears to have no sensitivity to actual victims of political violence.  Nor any sense of contrition for their shared failure to assist/rehabilitate the same.
In the process there is a sense of desperation on the part of the factions to want to claim those sizable number of supporters who have long been feeling  abandoned after losing relatives, limbs or property through political violence.    These supporters are however not naive or simply victims.  Given the fact that a number of them are in positions of leadership in either factions, they do not have any intention of leaving their respective placements if their issues are not addressed. Instead, they intend to negotiate for a greater stake in the political processes of their camps.
Especially by way of leadership positions based on the recognition of not only their suffering political violence but also their ‘staying the course’  with one faction or the other.
This is all understandable particularly for those members who are finding themselves in a position in which they are now important to their respective national leadership. They have probably found new leases of political relevance due to the infighting, but at least its a recognition that had been missing for some time in the then united MDC T.
The more serious reflections are however the evident intentions of the factional leaders to scramble for this one-time abandoned party constituency.  The fact that they have now decided to publicly accuse each other of allegedly abandoning party victims of political violence in favour of opulent lifestyles is not only political opportunism of a dishonest nature. It is also a politics that sacrifices the seriousness of the issue of political violence and its victims at the altar of short term political expediency.
It is most unfortunate that both factions of the MDC-T have embarked on a public blame game on this issue.  Thee end effect of such will be in two particular respects. Firstly that the entirety of the issue of victims of political violence will be weakened in national discourse due to its continued politicisation or its being viewed from the accusatory angel of one faction over another.  This will undermine its being viewed as a holistic national issue that must transcend factional party politics in order for it to be legally and culturally impermissible in our body politic.
Secondly, the very fact that being close to or being a victim of political violence is now possibly being  presented as a legitimating act in the pursuit of leadership, or at least viewed as a demonstration of authenticity, does not bode well for opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It is bad enough to be a victim of political violence, an occurrence that must be taken most seriously particularly in terms of the rule of law than expedient political grandstanding only for the purposes of garnering factional support.
Instead of name calling, it would be democratically preferable if either of the two factions placed generic proposals on transitional justice on the policy table for consideration by the Human Rights or the  National Peace and Reconciliation Constitutional Commissions.  Or any other legal body they find constitutionally fit to deal much more holistically with the challenge of seeking justice and compensation for victims of political violence.
Finally, one of the key debating points around issues of political violence has been its one-sided nature, particularly where it concerns the ruling party supporters and state structure victimisation of opposition party members.  In this debate, it is emerging that a new trend of a shared  political traits and characteristic of a culture of violence might be affecting all major political parties. Both internally and in part externally.  Especially in cases where there are congresses or general elections to be held.  The issue therefore becomes a problem that cuts across the political divide, though at varying scales.
It is therefore a problem that is no longer in need of opportunistic partisanship but a much more concerted and holistic approach. While its effects and structural occurrence will not be solved overnight, it would be a good start if the MDC factions demonstrated good and organised leadership in seeking to address it.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)I read with great sadness, a story that appeared in a local daily, The Newsday, about the two MDC factions having a public spat about victims of political violence.  The Biti faction, through its spokesperson callously accused the Tsvangirai faction of having abandoned victims of political violence for ‘wives and houses’.  In turn, the Tsvangirai faction also through its spokesperson,  accused their newfound rivals of not only being elitist but also having abandoned victims of political violence.
While one understands that rivalry in opposition politics has been generally about petty grandstanding and name calling, this particular spat is not only tragic but callous.  It points to a political leadership that appears to have no sensitivity to actual victims of political violence.  Nor any sense of contrition for their shared failure to assist/rehabilitate the same.
In the process there is a sense of desperation on the part of the factions to want to claim those sizable number of supporters who have long been feeling  abandoned after losing relatives, limbs or property through political violence.    These supporters are however not naive or simply victims.  Given the fact that a number of them are in positions of leadership in either factions, they do not have any intention of leaving their respective placements if their issues are not addressed. Instead, they intend to negotiate for a greater stake in the political processes of their camps.
Especially by way of leadership positions based on the recognition of not only their suffering political violence but also their ‘staying the course’  with one faction or the other.
This is all understandable particularly for those members who are finding themselves in a position in which they are now important to their respective national leadership. They have probably found new leases of political relevance due to the infighting, but at least its a recognition that had been missing for some time in the then united MDC T.
The more serious reflections are however the evident intentions of the factional leaders to scramble for this one-time abandoned party constituency.  The fact that they have now decided to publicly accuse each other of allegedly abandoning party victims of political violence in favour of opulent lifestyles is not only political opportunism of a dishonest nature. It is also a politics that sacrifices the seriousness of the issue of political violence and its victims at the altar of short term political expediency.
It is most unfortunate that both factions of the MDC-T have embarked on a public blame game on this issue.  Thee end effect of such will be in two particular respects. Firstly that the entirety of the issue of victims of political violence will be weakened in national discourse due to its continued politicisation or its being viewed from the accusatory angel of one faction over another.  This will undermine its being viewed as a holistic national issue that must transcend factional party politics in order for it to be legally and culturally impermissible in our body politic.
Secondly, the very fact that being close to or being a victim of political violence is now possibly being  presented as a legitimating act in the pursuit of leadership, or at least viewed as a demonstration of authenticity, does not bode well for opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It is bad enough to be a victim of political violence, an occurrence that must be taken most seriously particularly in terms of the rule of law than expedient political grandstanding only for the purposes of garnering factional support.
Instead of name calling, it would be democratically preferable if either of the two factions placed generic proposals on transitional justice on the policy table for consideration by the Human Rights or the  National Peace and Reconciliation Constitutional Commissions.  Or any other legal body they find constitutionally fit to deal much more holistically with the challenge of seeking justice and compensation for victims of political violence.
Finally, one of the key debating points around issues of political violence has been its one-sided nature, particularly where it concerns the ruling party supporters and state structure victimisation of opposition party members.  In this debate, it is emerging that a new trend of a shared  political traits and characteristic of a culture of violence might be affecting all major political parties. Both internally and in part externally.  Especially in cases where there are congresses or general elections to be held.  The issue therefore becomes a problem that cuts across the political divide, though at varying scales.
It is therefore a problem that is no longer in need of opportunistic partisanship but a much more concerted and holistic approach. While its effects and structural occurrence will not be solved overnight, it would be a good start if the MDC factions demonstrated good and organised leadership in seeking to address it.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)I read with great sadness, a story that appeared in a local daily, The Newsday, about the two MDC factions having a public spat about victims of political violence.  The Biti faction, through its spokesperson callously accused the Tsvangirai faction of having abandoned victims of political violence for ‘wives and houses’.  In turn, the Tsvangirai faction also through its spokesperson,  accused their newfound rivals of not only being elitist but also having abandoned victims of political violence.
While one understands that rivalry in opposition politics has been generally about petty grandstanding and name calling, this particular spat is not only tragic but callous.  It points to a political leadership that appears to have no sensitivity to actual victims of political violence.  Nor any sense of contrition for their shared failure to assist/rehabilitate the same.
In the process there is a sense of desperation on the part of the factions to want to claim those sizable number of supporters who have long been feeling  abandoned after losing relatives, limbs or property through political violence.    These supporters are however not naive or simply victims.  Given the fact that a number of them are in positions of leadership in either factions, they do not have any intention of leaving their respective placements if their issues are not addressed. Instead, they intend to negotiate for a greater stake in the political processes of their camps.
Especially by way of leadership positions based on the recognition of not only their suffering political violence but also their ‘staying the course’  with one faction or the other.
This is all understandable particularly for those members who are finding themselves in a position in which they are now important to their respective national leadership. They have probably found new leases of political relevance due to the infighting, but at least its a recognition that had been missing for some time in the then united MDC T.
The more serious reflections are however the evident intentions of the factional leaders to scramble for this one-time abandoned party constituency.  The fact that they have now decided to publicly accuse each other of allegedly abandoning party victims of political violence in favour of opulent lifestyles is not only political opportunism of a dishonest nature. It is also a politics that sacrifices the seriousness of the issue of political violence and its victims at the altar of short term political expediency.
It is most unfortunate that both factions of the MDC-T have embarked on a public blame game on this issue.  Thee end effect of such will be in two particular respects. Firstly that the entirety of the issue of victims of political violence will be weakened in national discourse due to its continued politicisation or its being viewed from the accusatory angel of one faction over another.  This will undermine its being viewed as a holistic national issue that must transcend factional party politics in order for it to be legally and culturally impermissible in our body politic.
Secondly, the very fact that being close to or being a victim of political violence is now possibly being  presented as a legitimating act in the pursuit of leadership, or at least viewed as a demonstration of authenticity, does not bode well for opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It is bad enough to be a victim of political violence, an occurrence that must be taken most seriously particularly in terms of the rule of law than expedient political grandstanding only for the purposes of garnering factional support.
Instead of name calling, it would be democratically preferable if either of the two factions placed generic proposals on transitional justice on the policy table for consideration by the Human Rights or the  National Peace and Reconciliation Constitutional Commissions.  Or any other legal body they find constitutionally fit to deal much more holistically with the challenge of seeking justice and compensation for victims of political violence.
Finally, one of the key debating points around issues of political violence has been its one-sided nature, particularly where it concerns the ruling party supporters and state structure victimisation of opposition party members.  In this debate, it is emerging that a new trend of a shared  political traits and characteristic of a culture of violence might be affecting all major political parties. Both internally and in part externally.  Especially in cases where there are congresses or general elections to be held.  The issue therefore becomes a problem that cuts across the political divide, though at varying scales.
It is therefore a problem that is no longer in need of opportunistic partisanship but a much more concerted and holistic approach. While its effects and structural occurrence will not be solved overnight, it would be a good start if the MDC factions demonstrated good and organised leadership in seeking to address it.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)I read with great sadness, a story that appeared in a local daily, The Newsday, about the two MDC factions having a public spat about victims of political violence.  The Biti faction, through its spokesperson callously accused the Tsvangirai faction of having abandoned victims of political violence for ‘wives and houses’.  In turn, the Tsvangirai faction also through its spokesperson,  accused their newfound rivals of not only being elitist but also having abandoned victims of political violence.
While one understands that rivalry in opposition politics has been generally about petty grandstanding and name calling, this particular spat is not only tragic but callous.  It points to a political leadership that appears to have no sensitivity to actual victims of political violence.  Nor any sense of contrition for their shared failure to assist/rehabilitate the same.
In the process there is a sense of desperation on the part of the factions to want to claim those sizable number of supporters who have long been feeling  abandoned after losing relatives, limbs or property through political violence.    These supporters are however not naive or simply victims.  Given the fact that a number of them are in positions of leadership in either factions, they do not have any intention of leaving their respective placements if their issues are not addressed. Instead, they intend to negotiate for a greater stake in the political processes of their camps.
Especially by way of leadership positions based on the recognition of not only their suffering political violence but also their ‘staying the course’  with one faction or the other.
This is all understandable particularly for those members who are finding themselves in a position in which they are now important to their respective national leadership. They have probably found new leases of political relevance due to the infighting, but at least its a recognition that had been missing for some time in the then united MDC T.
The more serious reflections are however the evident intentions of the factional leaders to scramble for this one-time abandoned party constituency.  The fact that they have now decided to publicly accuse each other of allegedly abandoning party victims of political violence in favour of opulent lifestyles is not only political opportunism of a dishonest nature. It is also a politics that sacrifices the seriousness of the issue of political violence and its victims at the altar of short term political expediency.
It is most unfortunate that both factions of the MDC-T have embarked on a public blame game on this issue.  Thee end effect of such will be in two particular respects. Firstly that the entirety of the issue of victims of political violence will be weakened in national discourse due to its continued politicisation or its being viewed from the accusatory angel of one faction over another.  This will undermine its being viewed as a holistic national issue that must transcend factional party politics in order for it to be legally and culturally impermissible in our body politic.
Secondly, the very fact that being close to or being a victim of political violence is now possibly being  presented as a legitimating act in the pursuit of leadership, or at least viewed as a demonstration of authenticity, does not bode well for opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It is bad enough to be a victim of political violence, an occurrence that must be taken most seriously particularly in terms of the rule of law than expedient political grandstanding only for the purposes of garnering factional support.
Instead of name calling, it would be democratically preferable if either of the two factions placed generic proposals on transitional justice on the policy table for consideration by the Human Rights or the  National Peace and Reconciliation Constitutional Commissions.  Or any other legal body they find constitutionally fit to deal much more holistically with the challenge of seeking justice and compensation for victims of political violence.
Finally, one of the key debating points around issues of political violence has been its one-sided nature, particularly where it concerns the ruling party supporters and state structure victimisation of opposition party members.  In this debate, it is emerging that a new trend of a shared  political traits and characteristic of a culture of violence might be affecting all major political parties. Both internally and in part externally.  Especially in cases where there are congresses or general elections to be held.  The issue therefore becomes a problem that cuts across the political divide, though at varying scales.
It is therefore a problem that is no longer in need of opportunistic partisanship but a much more concerted and holistic approach. While its effects and structural occurrence will not be solved overnight, it would be a good start if the MDC factions demonstrated good and organised leadership in seeking to address it.
*Takura Zhangazha writes here in his personal capacity (takura-zhangazha.blogspot.com)

Its a Tough Life for University Students in Zimbabwe.

With the popular belief that education is the key to success and good life, one wonders whether going to a University in Zimbabwe is still ideal given the financial constraints students undergo.

Many challenges are faced by students during and after their period of study at universities. These include struggling to pay for tuition fees through to accommodation and food or general upkeep. This then tends to force them to resort to any available means or sadly having no choice but to drop out of university altogether.

For those that manage to painstakingly complete their studies, a new worry becomes what to do with their degrees after graduation due to lack of employment opportunities. This has in part led to some graduates pursuing basic survival economic activities such as vending and cross border trading. In even worse circumstances, students resort prostitution while others feel that they have no option but to leave for neighbouring countries like South Africa and Botswana to search for hard to find work.

To give examples of the hardships aced by students I did a preliminary survey and I found that indeed the situation is dire.
Early this year, undergraduate parallel and masters students at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) went for almost three weeks, while preparing for exams, without attending lectures as lecturers went on strike for not being paid their salaries for part time students. The institution at that time stated that the failure to pay lecturers was due to part time students owing the university about US$1.3 million, which shows how much students are struggling to pay fees.

At the Great Zimbabwe University, it appears that there are some students who have turned to the world oldest profession in order to raise fees. “Some girls engage in prostitution so they can get a good living and money for fees,” said a student from Great Zimbabwe University, Precious Maseko.”Some of the money they use to buy food and clothes.”

Such means of finding money have led to increases in the rate of HIV/AIDS in the country with high learning institutions having the highest rate.

However some students manage to get part time jobs during their course of study but that has not been easy on them.

“It’s difficult to balance school and work at the same time,” said a student from one of the local universities, Progress Matunzwa. “Also at times we go for a number of months without being paid because of economic situations but school authorities expect their fees to be paid on time.”

In institutions like Midlands State University rents costs between $240 and $270 per semester excluding food on top of an average fees of about $600. Other institutions like the NUST charge rents of about $450 per semester on campus and about $80 per month on private residents plus an average of $600 per semester depending on programs and transport money.

Long ago, students from high school could get temporary teaching posts to help them to proceed to universities. However currently temporary teaching posts are being offered to degree and certificate holders, worsening the financial situation for new students. Not every graduate or certificate holder makes it to the list of successful temporary teachers.

After graduation, some companies require employees with years of experience disadvantaging graduates without experience from getting the job, but one wonders where to get that needed experience to get a job if companies don’t give them a hands-on chance.

A student from University of Zimbabwe, Nkosi Moyo said, “Zimbabwe has to provide a policy that makes it a must for companies to provide part time jobs not only on attachment, but to help them gain some experience such that by the time they finish their degrees they are up to standard because if you employ people that know what is expected of them you will improve in many ways.”

Universities should also motivate students, through entrepreneurship courses and workshops, to start their business projects so that they create new job opportunities, helping them financially rather than to rely on being employed.

Some students suggested that government should provide them with grants or create ways that will allow them to finish paying their fees after graduations.